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The Long and Winding Road from Monroe to Connick 
 Sheldon Nahmod
1
 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 What I propose to do is sketch a history of § 1983
2
 local government liability in the 
Supreme Court, including Connick v. Thompson, and then situate Connick more generally in § 
1983 jurisprudence.
3
 I will emphasize the importance to the Court, in the last several decades 
especially, of federalism and its impact on the scope of § 1983.  Section 1983 is a kind of 
federalism lightning rod because it is a federal statute enforced against state and local 
governments by the federal judiciary.
4
 
 The Court’s interest in federalism in the § 1983 setting includes an increasing concern 
with federal judicial intervention in, and second-guessing of, the decisions of local 
                                                          
1
 Distinguished Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. B.A., University of Chicago; J.D., L.LM, Harvard 
Law School; M. A. Rel. Stud., University of Chicago Divinity School. I want to thank the Journal for inviting me to 
participate in this very interesting symposium. 
In an effort to preserve the unique nature of the symposium, this article is based largely on a transcript of Professor 
Nahmod’s presentation and his notes and has been edited and supplemented with references in order to facilitate 
research in the area of § 1983. 
 
2
 Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State 
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
3
 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011).  
4
 See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Owen v. City 
of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); City of 
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985);  Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Canton 
v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997). See generally S. NAHMOD, 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW OF SECTION 1983 (4th ed. 2011) 
[hereinafter CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES LITIGATION]. 
2 
 
governments.
5
 Federalism, broadly defined, has affected not only § 1983 local government 
failure to train liability, but also the scope of constitutional rights and the extent of the absolute 
and qualified immunity of state and local government officials. 
II.  BACKGROUND:  FEDERALISM, THE COURT, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO TRAIN 
 
 It may be in order to briefly remind ourselves of several important points about 
federalism as contemplated by the Framers. Federalism is intended not only to preserve state 
powers but, like separation of powers, to protect citizens from possible tyranny of the federal 
government.
6
 It is structural in nature.
7
 Other important values include efficiency, promoting 
individual choice, encouraging experimentation and promoting democracy.
8
 To a considerable 
extent, the Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments changed this—the  degree to which it 
did so remains controversial to this day—by recognizing that the states could pose dangers to  
their citizens and that it was the federal government that should protect them.
9
 
Section 1983 was enacted in 1871 by the 42nd Congress to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment; however, it remained largely dormant until 1961 when the Supreme Court decided 
Monroe v. Pape.
10
  It was dormant until this time because incorporation of the Bill of Rights only 
                                                          
5
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“…the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between 
federal and state power has given rise to many of the Court's most difficult and celebrated cases.”); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 575 (1995) (“This case requires us to consider our place in the design of the Government and 
to appreciate the significance of federalism in the whole structure of the Constitution.”); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (“The great innovation of this design was that “our citizens would have two political 
capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other...”) (citation omitted); United States 
v. Morrision, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (“The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what 
is truly local.”) (citations omitted). 
6
 See Erwin Chermerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 524-25 (1995). 
7
 Id.  
8
 Id. 
9
 Lopez v. Monterey Cnty. 525 U.S. 266, 268 (1999) (“…the Reconstruction Amendments…by their nature 
contemplate some intrusion into areas traditionally reserved to the States.”). 
10
 See CONG. GLOBE, 42nd CONG., 1ST SESS. 83 (1871); Monroe, 365 U.S. at 171 (“… as defining the rights secured 
by the Constitution of the United States when they are assailed by any State law or under color of any State law, and 
it is merely carrying out the principles of the civil rights bill, which has since become a part of the Constitution, viz., 
3 
 
began in earnest in the 1960s, and the state action doctrine was being developed in fits and starts 
to encompass more and more nominally private conduct, including joint conduct.
11
  
Monroe not only changed the § 1983 landscape but it also resurrected § 1983.  
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Monroe interpreted the statute as creating a Fourteenth 
Amendment damages action, a constitutional tort, against Chicago police officers for allegedly 
violating the plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.12 In so doing, the Court 
importantly ruled: (1) “color of law” is as broad as state action;13 (2) a plaintiff need not first 
exhaust state judicial remedies before filing a § 1983 claim in federal court;
14
 and (3) § 1983 
should be interpreted against the background of tort liability that makes a person responsible for 
the natural consequences of his or her conduct.
15
   
Two other aspects of Monroe are important for present purposes.  First, Justice 
Frankfurter’s dissent argued at great length that “color of law” was narrower in scope than state 
action.
16
 This meant that § 1983 did not cover all Fourteenth Amendment violations.  His dissent 
was grounded on a view of federalism that insisted that the Framer’s concept of federalism was 
not changed much, if at all, by the Civil War and the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendment.
17
 This dissent turns out to have anticipated future developments in the Court, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (quoting Senator George F. Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary). 
11
 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 721-23 (1961) (discussing private conduct in the context of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). See, on state action and color of law, NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 
ch. 2. 
12
 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 192. 
13
 Id. at 187. 
14
 Id. at 183. 
15
 Id. 
16
 Id. at 217-59 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). 
17
 Id. at 221-39. 
4 
 
including the City of Boerne case that imposed rather severe limitations on Congress’s Section 5 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment.
18
  
Second, the Court held unanimously (prompted in large measure by a lengthy memo on § 
1983’s legislative history to the other justices by Justice Frankfurter) that local governments 
were not suable persons.
19
 It may be significant that Monroe was decided six years after Brown 
II,
20
 which started the Court down the road of equitable federal judicial supervision of, and 
intervention in, school district decision-making, sometimes on a day-to-day basis.
21
 Brown 
marked the beginning of institutional reform litigation in the Supreme Court, and perhaps, the 
Court simply did not want at such a delicate time, to confront the specter of § 1983 damages 
actions brought against school districts that had engaged in school segregation.
22
  
It was only in 1978 that the Court, in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, overruled the 
local government liability holding of Monroe.
23
 In an opinion by Justice Brennan that revisited 
the legislative history of § 1983 and concluded that Monroe had gotten it wrong, the Court held 
that local governments of all kinds, special or general purpose, were suable persons under § 
1983.
24
  Further, the Court held that local governments could be liable for damages where the 
constitutional violation was committed by a local government official or employee pursuant to 
                                                          
18
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519-29 (1997) (discussing Congress’ power  under Section 5 and how 
that power is constrained when enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment upon the States). 
19
 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 191-92. 
20
 Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955). 
21
See, e.g., Griffin v. Cnty Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964); Green v. Ctny. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441-42 
(1968); Alexander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969). 
22
 See David Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional Reform Litigation: A Commentary on 
the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the Second Circuit’s Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1239 (1993). 
23
Monell v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 663, 700 (1978). See, on local government liability, NAHMOD, 
CIVIL RIGHT AND LIBERTIES ch. 6. 
24
Id. at 700.   
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an official policy or custom.
25
 Moreover, the Court emphasized Congressional intent to subject 
local governments to damages liability under § 1983.
26
  
 At the same time, the Court in Monell rejected respondeat superior liability altogether 
because of § 1983’s “subjects, or causes to be subjected” language.27 This insistence on avoiding 
respondeat superior liability was later to emerge with a vengeance in the Court’s failure to train 
and supervise decisions in City of Canton v. Harris
28
 and Bryan County v. Brown,
29
 the 
precursors to Connick v. Thompson.
30
  
Monell expressed little concern with federalism and over-deterrence because the Court 
correctly assumed that Congress was well within its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to impose damages liability on local governments.
31
 Indeed, the Court soon 
thereafter went beyond Monell and held in Owen v. City of Independence
32
 that local 
governments were not protected by qualified immunity.
33
   
 It is worth noting that by 1978, the Court and the country were, for the most part, past the 
Southern resistance to Brown.
34
 De jure segregation in the public schools and elsewhere was 
technically over; however, de facto segregation and re-segregation were of greater concern.
35
  So 
                                                          
25
 Id. at 694-95. 
26
 Id. at 696-700. 
27
 Id. at 658. 
28
489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989) (holding that under certain circumstances municipalities can be held liable under § 1983 
for constitutional violations stemming from failure to train its employees). 
29
520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997) (holding that unless there is deliberate action that is attributable to the municipality and 
is the driving force behind the plaintiff’s deprivation of federal rights, Congress did not intend for a municipality to 
be held liable under § 1983). 
30
 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
31
 Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 (holding that a municipality was a person under § 1983); but cf. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of 
State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (using Eleventh Amendment language, the Court held that states were not suable 
persons under § 1983 regardless of where sued). 
32
 445 U.S. 622 (1980). 
33
 Id. at 657; but see Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981) (holding that history and policy do 
support imposing punitive damages on municipalities for the bad-faith actions of its officials).   
34
 Brown v. Bd. of Ed. (Brown I), 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that racial discrimination in public education is 
unconstitutional). 
35
 The Honorable David S. Tatel, Judicial Methodology, Southern School Desegregation, and the Rule of Law, 79 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1071, 1081 (1999) (“Although the Supreme Court’s second Brown decision in 1955 (Brown II) 
6 
 
there was little chance that there would be a flood of § 1983 damages actions against school 
districts that had previously engaged in school segregation. 
  Significantly, Monell, which clearly involved an official policy set out by the local 
government entity itself, also stated that official policy could be made by “[lawmakers] or by 
those whose edicts or acts may be fairly said to represent official policy.”36 Monell thus created 
the policymaker category, under which a local government could be held liable for the 
unconstitutional conduct of a high ranking government official considered under state and local 
law to be a policymaker.
37
 In other words, the unconstitutional conduct of a policymaker could 
be attributed to a local government.  The Court’s subsequent decisions regarding policymakers 
made clear that even a single incident, that is, a single unconstitutional act of a policymaker, 
could be attributed to the relevant local government and render it liable.
38
   
As a lead-in to City of Canton, note that in 1985, the first Supreme Court decision to 
address failure to train liability was handed down in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle.
39
 In Tuttle, 
the Court ruled that an instruction to a jury that a city’s failure to train liability could be based on 
a single incident was reversible error, and that the deliberate indifference state of mind 
requirement, as a matter of § 1983 interpretation, was an effective way of avoiding respondeat 
superior liability.
40
  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
directed school officials and federal district courts to plan ‘a transition to…racially nondiscriminatory school 
system[s]’ with ‘all deliberate speed,’ many southern states instead radically altered their education laws to thwart 
desegregation.”) (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Ed., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)). 
36
 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.  
37
 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986) (“Monell reasoned that recovery from a municipality is 
limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts ‘of the municipality’—that is, acts which the municipality has 
officially sanctioned or ordered.”). 
38
 Id. at 480 (“…it is plain that municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers 
under appropriate circumstances.”). 
39
 City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).  
40
 Id. at 822-24. 
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 Finally, in 1989, City of Canton v. Harris firmly established the principle, somewhat 
counter-intuitive, that a local government’s failure to train its police officers could constitute an 
actionable official policy or custom.
41
 Specifically, a local government’s deliberately indifferent 
failure to adequately train its police officers with regard to the rights of citizens with whom the 
police come into contact could constitute an actionable official policy or custom.
42
 It was thus 
the inadequate training that constituted the official policy or custom.
43
 In articulating this 
deliberate indifference standard (rather than, say, a negligence standard), the Court in City of 
Canton was very careful to emphasize that it was concerned with the specter of respondeat 
superior liability in the guise of liability based on a single incident of police misconduct.
44
 The 
Court also insisted that there be a close causal connection between the identified deficiency in 
training and the plaintiff’s constitutional violation.45 
 On the other hand, in a footnote that turned out to be significant over two decades later in 
Connick, the Court in City of Canton observed that there could be rare situations in which the 
need for training was so obvious that it would constitute actionable deliberate indifference.
46
 For 
example, where a city knows that police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons and it 
supplies the police with firearms but does not provide them with any training in the use of deadly 
force, it  is obvious that training was required, and thus the failure to provide it constitutes 
actionable deliberate indifference.
47
  
                                                          
41
 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989). 
42
 Id. at 388. 
43
 Id. at 390-92. 
44
 Id.   
45
 Id. at 385-86.  
46
 Id. at 390 n.10. 
47
 Id. 
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  Finally, it is worth mentioning that in his opinion for the Court, Justice White explicitly 
emphasized that important federalism interests were implicated in local government liability 
failure to train situations.
48
  Specifically, the Court questioned whether it was appropriate for the 
federal courts to second-guess local government training programs.
49
  
 Consider why this is so: what is on trial in failure to train cases is the local government’s 
training program itself.  A plaintiff must prove what adequate training is and why the training 
offered was inadequate.  This requires federal courts to carefully evaluate every aspect of that 
training in order to decide whether the plaintiff’s claim can go forward.  Even though this inquiry 
is made in connection with damages and not equitable relief, it nevertheless remains intrusive. 
Indeed, it is typically more intrusive than a §1983 damages action based on an official policy or 
custom of the local government itself or on the single act of a policymaker.
50
  
Eight years after City of Canton, Bryan County v. Brown addressed a § 1983 damages 
action against a county based on an allegedly improper hiring decision by a county sheriff who 
was a policymaker for the county.
51
 Inadequate screening was the specific claim.
52
 A deputy 
sheriff hired by the county sheriff used excessive force against a woman and seriously injured 
her when he pulled her out of her car.
53
 The plaintiff claimed that had the county sheriff 
adequately screened the applicant for deputy sheriff, he would have found that assault and 
battery charges had once been leveled against the applicant.
54
 
                                                          
48
 Id. at 392. 
49
 Id.  
50
 Id. at 391-92. 
51
 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 400 (1997). 
52
 Id.  
53
 Id.  
54
 Id. 
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 Notice the tension in Bryan County between the Court’s previously established principles  
that (1) a single decision by a policymaker could render a local government liable
55
 and  (2) there 
was no respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
56
 The latter principle established a posture of 
extreme skepticism toward local government liability based on a single incident.
57
  
Here is what is important for present purposes: in Bryan County, the Court tightened up 
the deliberate indifference standard of City of Canton and declared:  
Only where adequate scrutiny of an applicant’s background would lead a 
reasonable policymaker to conclude that the plainly obvious consequence of the 
decision to hire the applicant would be the deprivation of a third person’s 
federally protected right can the official’s failure to adequately scrutinize the 
applicant’s background constitute “deliberate indifference.”58  
 
And in Bryan County itself, even adequate screening that would have discovered the assault and 
battery charge would not necessarily have avoided this particular Fourth Amendment violation, 
the use of excessive force.
59
 Put another way, this particular constitutional violation was not the 
plainly obvious consequence of the allegedly inadequate screening, with the result that the 
county sheriff was not deliberately indifferent to it. 
 Bryan County thus made the proximate cause inquiry much more difficult for a plaintiff 
to overcome by focusing on the particular constitutional violation that occurred, and not 
constitutional violations in general.
60
 As a result, there is both a deliberate indifference 
requirement and a related, and tough, proximate cause requirement for § 1983 plaintiffs.
61
 And 
even though, as a technical matter, this requirement was announced in an inadequate screening, 
                                                          
55
 See Pembaur v. City of Cinncinatti, 475 U.S. 469, 489 (1986). 
56
 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 490-92 (1989). 
57
 See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 821-22 (1985).  
58
 Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 411(emphasis added). 
59
 Id. at 411-14. 
60
 See id. 
61
 Id. at 415. 
10 
 
hiring case, the circuits have tended to apply the “plainly obvious consequence” standard in 
failure to train cases generally.
62
  
 Consequently, the Court in Bryan County gave lower federal courts even greater judicial 
control over the failure to train liability issue than before. Not only was the policymaker question 
one of law, but now federal courts could more readily take failure to train cases from juries by 
applying the plainly obvious consequences standard.  
 As an historical footnote, Bryan County led three of the dissenting justices to  advocate 
Justice Stevens’ position from years earlier.  Specifically, the dissenters believed that local 
government liability law had become so complex, so arcane, that it was now time to reexamine 
Monell’s holding that respondeat superior liability is not available under § 1983! 63 
This brings us finally to Connick, handed down, as we all know, in 2011.
64
 I want to set 
out the case in some detail, with your indulgence. After I offer some observations about Connick, 
I will conclude, through a federalism lens, by situating Connick within § 1983 jurisprudence 
generally. 
III. AN ANALYSIS OF CONNICK V. THOMPSON 
 In Connick, a 5-4 decision with an opinion by Justice Thomas,  the Court effectively held 
that local government liability for failure to train may never be based on a single incident.
65
 This 
is the case even in the face of an otherwise persuasive claim of deliberate indifference where the 
                                                          
62
 See, e.g., Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1309 (10th Cir. 1998); Gros v. City of Grand Prairie, 209 F.3d 431, 
435 (5th Cir. 2000); Morris v. Crawford Cnty., 299 F. 3d 919, 924-25 (8th Cir. 2002). 
63
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 520 U.S. at 437; see City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 834-44 (1985) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 489-91 (1986) (Stevens, J. concurring).   
64
 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
65
 Id. at 1365-66. 
11 
 
need for training is “obvious.”66 Instead, the plaintiff must also show a pattern of similar 
constitutional violations.
67
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, concurred.
68
 Justice Ginsburg 
dissented, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.
69
 
A.  THE FACTS AND ISSUES 
 The § 1983 plaintiff, Thompson, was convicted of murder and spent fourteen years on 
death row (and eighteen years total in prison) for a crime that he did not commit.
70
 Although it 
was unknown at the time, the prosecutors did not turn over to Thompson’s attorney a lab report 
from an earlier related case in which he had previously been convicted of attempted aggravated 
armed robbery.
71
 This lab report indicated that the perpetrator of the attempted armed robbery 
had type B blood, while the plaintiff had type O blood.
72
 Because of that conviction, the plaintiff 
did not testify in his own defense at his murder trial, where he was convicted.
73
 Many years later, 
the lab report that the prosecutors had failed to turn over was discovered, which resulted in the 
plaintiff’s 1999 attempted armed robbery conviction being vacated and his 2002 murder 
conviction being overturned.
74
 A subsequent murder retrial in 2003, at which plaintiff testified in 
his defense, resulted in a not guilty verdict.
75
 
 Thompson then sued the prosecutor’s office for damages under § 1983.76 In essence, he 
made a local government liable for failure to train claim with regard to proper training under 
                                                          
66
 Id.  
67
 Id. 
68
 Id. at 1366. 
69
 Id. at 1369.  
70
 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
71
 Id. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Id. at 1356-57. 
74
 Id. 
75
 Id. at 1357. 
76
 Id. 
12 
 
Brady v. Maryland,
77
 which imposed a due process requirement on prosecutors to turn over 
exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.
78
 A jury awarded Thompson $14 million, which 
was upheld by the district court.
79
 On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the award in a 
decision later vacated by the Fifth Circuit when it granted en banc review.
80
 However, since the 
en banc Fifth Circuit (in several opinions) was evenly divided, the district court’s decision was 
affirmed.
81
 
 The basis of the jury verdict and district court judgment was twofold. First, Connick, the 
district attorney, was a policymaker (thus representing the prosecutor’s office) who was 
deliberately indifferent to an obvious need to train prosecutors regarding their obligations under 
Brady.
82
 Second, the lack of Brady training was the moving force behind the plaintiff’s 
constitutional injury.
83
 The en banc Fifth Circuit divided evenly on each of these findings.
84
 The 
Court granted certiorari to decide the following question presented: “Does imposing failure-to-
train liability on a district attorney’s office for a single Brady violation contravene the rigorous 
culpability and causation standards of Canton and Bryan County?”85 As noted, the Court 
answered yes.
86
 
 B. THE ORAL ARGUMENT 
The oral argument in Connick, with the participation of all of the justices but Thomas, 
signaled the outcome. During the defense argument, Justice Ginsburg pointed out, as did Justice 
                                                          
77
 Id.  
78
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  
79
 Thompson v. Connick, No. 03-2045, 2005 WL 1200826, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 23, 2007). 
80
 Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 2008), vacated, 562 F.3d 711 (5th Cir. 2009), and aff’d en banc, 
578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009). 
81
 Connick, 578 F.3d  at 293 (en banc).  
82
 Id. at 296. 
83
 Id. 
84
 Id. at 293. 
85
 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011). 
86
 Id. 
13 
 
Breyer later, that even though this was arguably just one incident, four prosecutors were 
involved.
87
 She also wondered why it was necessary to shoehorn this case into a single incident 
because it did not fit either into the single incident category or into the pattern of constitutional 
violations category.
88
 Justice Breyer asked about the jury instruction that was objected to, which 
eventually elicited the response that the case was about the evidentiary basis for the jury’s 
finding of deliberate indifference.
89
 Justice Kennedy, who was to be the swing vote in this 5-4 
decision, pointed out that the district court had rejected the defense’s pattern of constitutional 
violations instruction.
90
 
 During the plaintiff’s argument, the attorney emphasized that this case was never about a 
single incident, and that the plaintiff had never relied on a single incident theory.
91
 Justices Alito 
and Roberts then hit plaintiff’s counsel hard with a series of questions about precisely what kind 
of Brady training the district attorney should have provided.
92
 They repeatedly emphasized the 
complexity—to them—of the training issue in this case.93 They also tried to identify the precise 
inadequacy of training that the plaintiff was challenging.
94
 Counsel responded, at least in part, 
that there was zero Brady training in the office.
95
 Justice Kennedy then commented, without 
elaboration, that he was concerned about causation, perhaps suggesting that he could not find the 
necessary causal link between the alleged inadequate training in Brady and the resulting Brady 
violation.
96
 
                                                          
87
 Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, 23, Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (No. 09-571). 
88
 Id. at 5.  
89
 Id. at 13-18.  
90
 Id. at 25-26.  
91
 Id. at 29.  
92
 Id. at 31-35.  
93
 Id. at 31-40.  
94
 Id. at 34-36. 
95
 Id. at 41.  
96
 Id. at 42-43. 
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 C. THE DECISION 
  1.  The Majority 
 Even though there had apparently been no Brady training whatever of prosecutors before 
1985 when the plaintiff was convicted of aggravated armed robbery, the Court, per Justice 
Thomas, rejected the plaintiff’s argument that this was one of those rare cases hypothesized in 
footnote 10 in City of Canton v. Harris.
97
 Recall that the Court in Canton had previously 
determined that a pattern of constitutional violations is not necessary to prove deliberate 
indifference where the need for training is “so obvious.”98 The Court once again emphasized the 
stringency of the deliberate indifference requirement for local government liability for failure to 
train, arising out the concern with avoiding respondeat superior liability under § 1983.
99
 
 According to the Court, prosecutors, unlike police officers going through training in the 
use of firearms and deadly force to stop fleeing felons (the example in City of Canton), were 
already trained in law in law school and had to pass a bar exam before they could practice.
100
 In 
addition, there were continuing legal education requirements imposed on all lawyers.
101
 Thus, 
“recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious consequence’ of failing to provide 
prosecutors with formal in-house training about how to obey the law.”102 Moreover, it was 
undisputed in this case that prosecutors were “familiar with the general Brady rule,” in marked 
contrast to armed police officers who have no prior knowledge at all about the constitutional use 
                                                          
97
 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361 (2011). 
98
 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989); Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360-61. 
99
 Connick, 131 S. Ct at 1360-61. 
100
 Id. at 1362-63. 
101
 Id. 
102
Id. at 1363.   
15 
 
of deadly force.
103
 Under these circumstances, the absence of formal training in Brady was not 
dispositive: this was not like the City of Canton hypothetical.
104
 
 The Court concluded:  
To prove deliberate indifference, Thompson needed to show that Connick was on 
notice that, absent additional specified training, it was ‘highly predictable’ that the 
prosecutors in his office would be confounded by those [Brady] gray areas and 
make incorrect Brady decisions as a result. In fact, Thompson had to show that it 
was so predictable that failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious 
disregard for defendants’ Brady rights.(emphasis in original). [And Thompson]  
did not do so.
105
 
 
 
2.  The Concurrence 
 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Alito, concurred for the purpose of responding to the 
arguments of the dissenters.
106
 Justice Scalia accused the dissenters of a “puzzling” and 
“lengthy” excavation of the trial record in a misguided attempt to broaden the scope of failure to 
train liability.
107
 He also rejected their contention that the defendant acquiesced in the plaintiff’s 
single incident theory.
108
 Furthermore, he criticized the dissenters’ position that, with proper 
training, “surely at least one” of the prosecutors would have turned over the exculpatory 
evidence.
109
 Finally, he suggested that any possible Brady violation in this case “was surely on 
the very frontier of our Brady jurisprudence.”110 
 
                                                          
103
 Id. 
104
 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). The footnote states:   
For example, city policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be required 
to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part to allow them to 
accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of 
deadly force, can be said to be “so obvious,” that failure to do so could properly be characterized 
as “deliberate indifference” to constitutional rights.  
Id.   
105
 Id. at 1365. 
106
 Id. at 1366. 
107
 Id.   
108
 Id. at 1367. 
109
 Id. at 1368. 
110
 Id. at 1369. 
16 
 
3.  The Dissent 
 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent (which she read in part from the bench), joined by Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan, argued that the evidence submitted to the jury indicated that the 
“conceded, long-concealed prosecutorial transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.”111 
“From the top down,” in the view of the dissent, prosecutors inadequately addressed their Brady 
obligations.
112
 Accordingly, a jury could have found that such inattention was “standard 
operating procedure” in Connick’s office.113 For this reason, City of Canton’s deliberate 
indifference standard was met here, even though there was no proof of a pattern of similar 
constitutional violations: the resulting Brady violation was the obvious consequence of the 
inadequate training.
114
 
 Furthermore, according to the dissent, Connick had “effectively” conceded that his 
office’s Brady training was inadequate.115  In addition, at the time of Thompson’s trial, Louisiana 
did not require continuing legal education for lawyers, thereby placing responsibility on 
Connick’s office for keeping prosecutors current on legal developments.116 Moreover, the 
majority’s reliance on law school and bar admission requirements “blinks reality and is belied by 
the facts of this case.”117 This case therefore fit well within City of Canton’s category of cases in 
which the need for training was so obvious that the failure to provide it could be said to 
demonstrate deliberate indifference; proof of a prior pattern was not necessary here.
118
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F.  SOME OBSERVATIONS ON CONNICK  
  The question presented for review by the defense was very well crafted to attract the 
Court’s attention at the certiorari stage. Motivated in large measure by the federalism concerns I 
mentioned earlier, the Court has long been concerned about the (mis)use of a single 
constitutional violation to impose liability on local governments for failure to train.
119
 Connick 
presented the Court with the opportunity to bury the City of Canton hypothetical once and for all, 
an opportunity that the Court seized. 
 Also, observe that Connick involved the training of prosecutors.
120
 But the Court’s 
reasoning suggests that plaintiffs in all failure to train cases will have to show a pattern of prior 
constitutional violations in order to demonstrate deliberate indifference.
121
 
 Further, with Connick, the Court has extended protection from damages liability to all 
levels of prosecution.
122
 Clearly, the individual prosecutors in Connick who failed to discharge 
their Brady obligations were absolutely immune from § 1983 damages liability in their 
individual capacities because their conduct was advocative in nature.
123
 Moreover, Connick 
himself as supervisor was similarly absolutely immune from damages liability personally.
124
  
This is supported by the Court’s holding in Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, which stated that 
supervisory prosecutors charged with failing to train prosecutors in connection with the proper 
use in criminal trials of jailhouse informants are absolutely immune from damages liability in 
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their individual capacities, despite the fact that this function is administrative in nature.
125
 The 
Court’s reasoning in Van de Kamp almost certainly applies to supervisory failures to train 
prosecutors about Brady.  And now, the Court in Connick has made it considerably more 
difficult to make out a cause of action against a prosecutor’s office for failure to train.126 
In addition, there was a hidden Bryan County causation issue in Connick that was not 
addressed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court did not address it (nor did it have to) 
perhaps because it had a bigger project in mind, namely, eliminating the City of Canton 
hypothetical. But here it is.  
 Thompson sought damages for his wrongful conviction and imprisonment for murder.
127
 
But, so far as I can tell, the failure to train and Brady violation occurred in connection with his 
prior conviction for attempted aggravated armed robbery.
128
 It was this failure to train and Brady 
violation that allegedly led to his attempted aggravated armed robbery conviction that, in turn, 
led to his not taking the stand in the murder trial that then resulted in his murder conviction and 
imprisonment.
129
 Query: was Thompson’s not taking the stand and the resulting murder 
conviction and imprisonment really the plainly obvious consequence of the failure to train 
prosecutors about the requirements of Brady in the prior attempted aggravated armed robbery 
case? The proximate cause answer would appear to be no, unless Thompson claimed that one or 
more of the prosecutors in his attempted aggravated armed robbery case deliberately withheld 
exculpatory evidence in order to prevent him from taking the stand in his murder case. 
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 Finally, I maintain Connick is best understood in the context of §1983 jurisprudence 
developments generally.  Over the past several decades, and at the same time the Court has been 
gradually limiting local government liability for failure to train, culminating in Connick, the 
Court has also been engaged in limiting the scope of § 1983 damages liability in other ways, 
prompted in large measure, as I have suggested, by federalism concerns. 
IV.  CONNICK THROUGH  A FEDERALISM LENS 
 One way the Court has been limiting local government liability for failure to train is 
through limiting the scope of the underlying constitutional provision. The Court, out of concern 
with both judicial intervention in, and judicial supervision of, local government decisions, and 
with the chilling effect of § 1983 litigation on the decision-making of individual state and local 
government officials, has limited the scope of procedural due process, substantive due process, 
the Eighth Amendment, equal protection and the First Amendment.
130
 
 Another way the Court has limited the scope of § 1983 damages liability in the name of 
protecting federalism is by gradually broadening the scope of qualified immunity for individual 
government officials and employees. Qualified immunity was originally intended to minimize 
the costs of liability.
131
  However, the Court has, to a considerable extent, converted it into the 
functional equivalent of absolute immunity in an attempt to minimize the costs of defending. 
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Thus, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, perhaps the most important qualified immunity decision of them 
all, the Court eliminated the subjective part of the prior two-part qualified immunity test, 
rendered that test objective and thus legal in nature and emphasized that qualified immunity 
should be decided quickly as possible, preferably before discovery, in order to minimize the 
costs of defending.
132
 In Anderson v. Creighton, the Court made the clearly settled law inquiry 
rather case-specific, thereby increasing qualified immunity protection for defendants.
133
 The 
Court even bent the final judgment rule in Mitchell v. Forsyth, a decision that federal courts have 
not been too happy with, and held that denials of defense motions for summary judgment based 
on qualified immunity were immediately appealable on issues of law.
134
 The purpose: to let 
qualifiedly immune defendants out from under § 1983 litigation as quickly as possible. 
 Connick was therefore not an aberration. It, like the other § 1983 decisions I have 
discussed all too briefly today, reflects the Court’s sensitivity—some would say 
oversensitivity—to federalism concerns. This includes an obvious wariness about  federal 
judicial intervention into state and local government matters regardless of the fact that it is 
Fourteenth Amendment rights (including incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights) that are 
protected by § 1983 damages actions.  
Now recall Justice Frankfurter’s view of federalism, written way back in 1961 in Monroe 
v. Pape, about the limited scope of § 1983’s color of law requirement.135 Here is what he wrote 
in his dissent:  
The jurisdiction which Article III of the Constitution conferred on the national 
judiciary reflected the assumption that the state courts, not the federal courts, 
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would remain the primary guardians of that fundamental security of person and 
property which the long evolution of the common law had secured to one 
individual as against other individuals. The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter 
this basic aspect of our federalism.
136
 
 It is such a view that appears, in significant measure, to be animating the Court’s current 
§ 1983 jurisprudence.  
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